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After more than a two-year delay, and amid much controversy that
polarized an otherwise apathetic population, the Constitution (Amendment)
(No. 2) Bill 2003 (hereinafter Act 10) was presented for the second time to
Parliament in July 2003. This time, all references to non-discrimination on the
ground of sexual orientation were excised from its provisions, a move that
guaranteed straight passage through Parliament. With the offending clause out
of the way, the president assented to the bill, and it became law on August 12,
2003.' This ought to have been cause for celebration, even in the absence of
the controversial amendment to the non-discrimination clause. After all, this
bill represented the culmination of the work of the Constitution Reform
Commission, whose remit included making recommendations to strengthen the
fundamental rights provisions of the controversial 1980 Constitution. In
keeping with its mandate, the explanatory memorandum to the bill grandly
promised the "elevation" of certain principles in the Constitution to the status
of fundamental rights, as well as the creation of "new" fundamental rights and
human rights.'
Rhetoric notwithstanding, the actual substance of the bill turned out to be
gravely disappointing, falling far short of the expectations raised by the costly
reform process. In all fairness, Act 10 does address some of the shortcomings
of the 1980 Constitution, and takes some tentative steps in the right direction.
To a regrettably large degree, however, the reforms do not go far enough, and
the equivocation surrounding the non-discrimination clause is but one
example. Other reforms, such as the incorporation of international human
rights standards, have been so butchered in their implementation that their
impact on Guyana's regime of human rights and fundamental freedoms is
likely to be negligible. Most surprising of all is the fact that many provisions
are ill-conceived, and reveal a limited understanding of human rights
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jurisprudence. Before embarking on this analysis, however, it might be useful
to outline briefly the political background that preceded Act 10.
I. BACKGROUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Following the December 1997 general elections, Georgetown was once
again wracked by internal strife and dissension. The now familiar pattern of
street protests, bomb threats and paralyzing ethnic tensions replayed itself
before a dismayed public, and it took the intervention of the previously
indifferent Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to achieve a truce between the
ruling party and the opposition, and with that, a temporary halt to the
disturbances. The resulting agreement, referred to as the Herdmanston
Accord, required constitutional reform among its menu of measures, with the
ultimate objective being the improvement of race relations.3
As it turned out, it took another year for a Constitution Reform Commission
(CRC) to be established. With this delay, and because of the timeline
previously agreed on, the CRC was left with a mere six months to conduct
public consultations and deliver its report. The CRC was mandated to address,
during its review of the Constitution, "the full protection of the fundamental
rights and freedoms of all Guyanese under the law and the CARICOM Charter
of Civil Society. ' '4 Other matters to be considered included the functioning of
the various branches of government, electoral reform and the rights of certain
vulnerable groups. Eventually, on July 17, 1999, the CRC presented its report
to Parliament. The report included detailed recommendations on the Bill of
Rights as well as on the presidency, the Cabinet, the judiciary, Parliament,
local government, elections, national security, the service commissions, and
even the economy.5 The majority of these were implemented in piecemeal
fashion throughout 2000 and 2001 by approximately ten statutes amending the
Constitution. The last was Act 10, which contained the bulk of the changes to
the fundamental rights provisions approved by the Parliamentary Oversight
Committee. Initially tabled in Parliament in late 2000, Act 10 was unani-
mously passed. However, by the time it was presented to the president for his
assent, several Christian fundamentalist groups belatedly discovered its
The Herdmanston Accord (Jan. 17, 1998), at http://www.caricom.org/pressreleases/pres06
_98.htm.
' Constitution ReformCommission Act 1999, § 6(2)(a) LAws oFGuY. ch. 1:14 (2003). The
act is available at http://www.gina.gov.gy/gina.pub/laws/Laws/capl14.pdf.
5 REPORT OFTHE CONSTITUTIONALREoRM COMMISSION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF
GUYANA on July 17, 1992 [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL REFRRM COMMISSION REPORT].
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existence and mounted a frenzied public campaign against it on account of its
inclusion of sexual orientation as a forbidden ground of discrimination. The
result, as they say, is history. The president ignored the unanimous vote of the
legislators and refused to give his assent. Shortly thereafter, Parliament was
dissolved for accelerated general elections slated for March 2001, and Act 10,
not having been signed into law, expired.
It was this history that delayed the implementation of the recommendations
of the CRC regarding fundamental rights, and led to the re-introduction of the
bill in Parliament in 2003. This time around, however, the government took
the politically expedient route and presented Act 10 to Parliament purged of
all references to sexual orientation. This sanitized version, though becoming
law and purporting to enact the recommendations of the CRC, is lacking not
only on account of its omission of the sexual orientation clause, but also with
respect to the actual changes implemented. This Article proposes to examine
Act 10 in three sections: Part II will be devoted to the amendments to the
various fundamental rights guarantees; Part IM will analyse the so-called new
rights created; and Part IV will comment on various issues ignored by Act 10,
in particular the abandoned sexual orientation non-discrimination guarantee.
fl. AMENDMENTS TO EXISTING GUARANTEES
A. Article 40(l)
Leading the suite of constitutional amendments is the drastic alteration of
article 40(1), a provision that precedes the substantive fundamental rights
guarantees of the Constitution. In its original form, as in the constitutions of
all the Commonwealth Caribbean countries except that of Trinidad and
Tobago, this article provided:
Every person in Guyana is entitled to the basic right to a happy,
creative and productive life, free from hunger, disease, ignorance
and want. That right includes the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but
subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for
the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely-
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the
law
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(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and
association, and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property
and from deprivation of property without compensation.6
The specific guarantees relating to life, liberty, protection of the law and other
rights, adverted to in the three sub-articles, also are outlined in Title 1 of the
Constitution, commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights.7
Jurists had long considered article 40 as merely introductory and not
conferring any justiciable rights, and no less an authority than the venerated
Chancellor J.O.F. Haynes propounded this view in Ameerally v. Attorney
General.' In this case, the appellants were charged with attempting to commit
an indictable offence, specifically an attempt to defraud the intending
purchaser by falsely inflating the worth of a commodity being sold. The Court
of Appeal agreed with the appellants that no offence was disclosed, as false
pretences cannot be grounded on a statement of opinion or representation of
quality. The Court held that "protection of the law" in section 3 of the 1966
Constitution (the predecessor to article 40 in the 1980 Constitution), relied on
by the appellants, was not meant to confer enforceable rights and therefore did
not prevent the State from proceeding with the charge.9
On this view, article 40 serves no purpose and ought to be dispensable
without adverse consequences. That appears to have been the reasoning of the
drafters, for Act 10 has repealed the whole of paragraph (1) of article 40 and
replaced it with the terse statement: "Every person in Guyana is entitled to the
basic right to a happy, creative and productive life, free from hunger, ignorance
and want. That right includes the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual." The tragedy of this amendment, however, is that it ignores
developments in the law, and extinguishes in one fell swoop the nascent
growth ofjurisprudence both in Guyana and the rest of the Caribbean that had
begun to accord to article 40(1), and in particular its "protection of the law"
clause, a more dynamic and vibrant role.
Kent Garment Factory v. Attorney General of Guyana"° was one of the
earliest cases to depart from Ameerally. By then, the 1966 Constitution had
6 GuY. CONST. art. 40(1); available at http:llwww.gegrgetown.edu/pdba/Consstitutions/
Guyana/guyana96.html.
7 GuY. CONST. tit. 1.
8 [19781 25 W.I.R. 272 (Guy.).
9 Id.
'0 [19911 46 W.I.R. 177 (Guy.),
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been replaced, and its section 3 provision was slightly modified in article 40
of the new 1980 Constitution by the deletion of the word "whereas." The
Court of Appeal found this change to be significant, and extrapolated that
article 40 conferred enforceable rights. In the words of Chancellor George:
[A]rticle 3 of the earlier Constitutions has been replaced by
article 40 and in my view any controversy as to whether or not
the replaced article is also preambulatory has been set at rest
because of the definitive words used in the new article. The
substituted article is a mix of idealism, and aspirations, of
statements of principle and of entitlements. And among those
entitlements is the right to the protection of the law.
As to the strength of this right, Chancellor George ventured:
In my opinion the concept of 'protection of the law' is premised
on the existence of a court system to which all would have access
in order to vindicate any perceived wrong or to defend against
any allegation of wrongdoing, and which after a fair hearing
would render an impartial judgment which would be binding and
enforceable.2
The tide had now turned and judges began to approach article 40 much
more expansively. In Abrams v. Attorney General of Guyana,3 the applicants,
who were charged indictably with trafficking in a controlled drug, successfully
relied on article 40's protection of the law (among other constitutional
provisions) to strike down a committal order against them. On its review of the
depositions, the Court found that there was no evidence to support the
offences, and accordingly nullified the committals.' 4 Again, "protection of the
law" was held to incorporate the right of access to court and a fair hearing
followed by an impartial judgment.
Most dramatically of all was the impact of this provision in Lewis v.
Attorney General of Jamaica. 5 In this case, the appellants, a number of men
" Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 191.
13 [1996] 3 C.H.R.L.D. 409.
14 Id.
15 [2000] 3 W.I.R. 1785.
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convicted of murder, had not been allowed to make representations to the
Mercy Committee, and the Jamaican government issued death warrants upon
the conclusion of that Committee's deliberations even though the men had
applications pending before international human rights bodies. According to
Her Majesty's Privy Council, these were irregularities that contravened the
rules of natural justice and deprived the appellants of the protection of the law
to which they were entitled under section 13 of the Jamaican Constitution (the
Jamaican equivalent to article 40).16 Accordingly, the death sentences were set
aside and commuted to life imprisonment.
Article 40 has thus evolved over the years into an extremely useful
provision, its potential limited only by the ingenuity of the judges tasked with
its enforcement. The substituted article, however, with its terse and barren
formulation, lacks similar potential, and is now without doubt merely
preambulatory in nature.
There is another, even more damaging consequence to Act 10's wholesale
repeal of article 40(1). This repeal has meant the removal of the sole reference
to privacy in the Guyana Constitution. It is evidently a little-known fact that
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, only Belize and Trinidad and Tobago have
a specific right to privacy in their constitutions. 7 In Guyana, privacy is only
mentioned in article 40(1)(c). Although this seems to be merely a passing
reference, in light of the continually expanding scope given to article 40, the
possibility loomed large that even this minimal formulation could be utilised
by an imaginative court in order to confer a constitutional protection of
privacy. With its drastic repeal, however, any such approach is completely
lost, and one is left to wonder whether this was the deliberate intention of the
drafters or whether it was simply a manifestation of their unfamiliarity with the
specifics of the Guyana Bill of Rights. Whatever the cause, Act 10 leaves the
Bill of Rights completely devoid of any reference to privacy, and combined
with the deletion of article 40's protection of the law clause, leaves it
considerably weaker than it was at the start of the reform process.
16 Id.
17 MARGARET DEMERIEUX, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
CONSTrrTmONs 296 (1992). Professor DeMerieux adds that only Belize and Trinidad confer
specifically "litigable" rights to privacy. Given subsequent developments, however, this author
must respectfilly disagree with that statement.
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B. The Right to Life
By the addition of paragraph IA to article 138, Act 10 provides that no
person can be executed for a crime committed when he or she was under the
age of eighteen years. This enshrines as a constitutional right a provision that
has long existed (and operated) in Guyana's law. Section 164 of the Criminal
Law (Procedure) Act, which provides for the implementation of the death
sentence, contains the following proviso: "[Slentence of death shall not be
pronounced on or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it
appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was
under the age of eighteen years.. ."" While there may be some benefit to
elevating the section 164 provision to fundamental right status, one has to
search for it given the other, more severe defects in the right to life enshrined
in article 138.
As a preliminary, it is important to mention the social context in which
article 138 operates, Accepting the interdependent relationship of laws and
social mores, the prevalence of extra judicial executions in Guyana should
have in turn prompted careful scrutiny of the constitutional framework as it
relates to the protection of life. In a study spanning two decades, the Guyana
Human Rights Association (GHRA) has documented that an average of fifteen
persons were shot to death annually by the police between 1980 and 1985,
which rose to an average of sixteen persons per year between 1996 and 200 L'
These numbers soared to twenty-eight persons per year in 2002 and thirty-nine
in 2003. In a sobering revelation, the GHRA disclosed that the Guyana
Police Force attracted as many allegations of excessive use of force in 1996
and 1997 as the New York Police Department, an incomparably larger body,
attracted for a period three times as long between 1989 and 1996.2" The sheer
scale of the problem is best exemplified by comparison to the Toronto
Metropolitan Police, where less than twenty-five fatalities from police
shootings occurred over a twenty-year period. 22 In this context, the CRC ought
to have been more sensitive to the severe failings of article 138.
IS Criminal Law (Procedure) Act, § 164, LAWS OF Guy. ch. 10:01 (2003).
'9 GHRA, Ambivalent About Violence: A Report on Fatal Shootings by the Police in
Guyana, 1980-2001, at 36 (2002).
' Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Guyana, Feb. 25,
2004, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27901.htm.
2' GHRA, supra note 19, at 30.
2 Id.
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To begin with, the paltry language of article 138 sets the stage for very
minimalist protection. While the Guyana Bill of Rights is loosely modelled on
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), article 138 substitutes a
negative protection in place of the ECHR's positive right. Whereas article 2
of the ECHR trumpets that "[elveryone's right to life shall be protected by
law,"23 article 138(1) merely protects against intentional deprivation of life
otherwise than by operation of law.24 This has led one Caribbean academic to
comment wryly, "In literal terms, the West Indian clauses confer an entitle-
ment not to be killed with no positive declaration of the protection of life."25
This is not a matter of mere syntax, as the negative formulation of article
138(1) leaves uncertain whether the State has any duty beyond the minimum
one of ensuring effective criminal sanctions for violations of the right to life.
By way of comparison, the positive language of article 2 of the ECHR has
permitted the European Court of Human Rights to interpret their guarantee as
including "in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual
whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual."26 While the
European Court refused to apply its own exemplary standard to the facts of
that case, it still acknowledged the expansive reach of the article, a potential
that Guyana's negative formulation lacks.
Another troubling feature of article 138 is its denial of the right to life to
persons convicted of "an offence under the law of Guyana." Unlike some
Caribbean constitutions which specify that the death penalty may only be
prescribed for the offences of treason and murder," the generality of Guyana's
formulation presents no similar boundaries. This is not idle academic
speculation, for already twice since this present Constitution came into effect
has the State extended the reach of the death penalty. In 1989, the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act was amended to provide the
death penalty for the offence of supplying or otherwise administering a
narcotic to a child or young person who dies as a result of consuming the
I Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights].
24 Article 138(1) reads, "No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the law of Guyana of which
he has been convicted." GUY. CONST. art. 138(1).
2 DEMERIEUX, supra note 17, at 122.
26 Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, para. 113 (1988).
27 See, e.g., ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 4(1).
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drug.2" An appalling feature of this offence is that it is applicable even where
the trafficker does not intend to cause death or even realises that death is likely
to result. Then, again in 2002, the government made the commission of a
"terrorist act" which results in the death of any person also punishable by
death.29 Astonishingly, "terrorist act" was undefined, so that it is capable of
capturing acts aimed at the destruction of property, and even worse, it is
committed once the act in question results in death, irrespective of an intention
to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. Whereas the ultimate penalty of death
had heretofore been reserved for offences such as murder, where the principal
possessed a specific intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm, these new
offences extend its application to offences approximating manslaughter or
unintentional killings.
In the civilised world, the trend has been, if not to abolish the death penalty
altogether, then at the least to limit its reach to the most heinous cases.
Certainly, it is unthinkable that it should apply to acts where the actor has no
intention to kill, and where, as in the case of the 2002 offence, there may well
exist a political dimension to the prohibited act in question. One man's
terrorist act is, after all, another man's act of political resistance. This kind of
intemperate legislation can be manipulated with disastrous social and political
consequences, and was only possible in the first place because of the loose
language of article 138(1). It is thus supremely disappointing that the CRC,
with all its expertise and the peculiar history that gave rise to it, overlooked
this issue.
Finally, article 138 is most seriously compromised because of its permitted
exceptions-those situations in which the use of lethal force is exempted from
its operation. The force used need only be "reasonably justifiable," a weaker
standard than that espoused by article 2(2) of the ECHR where the force must
be "no more than is absolutely necessary. 30 Moreover, the situations that fall
outside of any constitutional protection are unnecessarily wide, and include
"the defence of property," 31 effecting "a lawful arrest" or preventing "the
escape of a person lawfully detained ' 32 and preventing "the commission... of
28 Narcotic Drugs and Psycholtropic Substances (Control) Act, § 6(1), LAWS OF GUY. ch.
35:11 (2003).
" Criminal Law (Offences) (Amendment) Act 2002 (inserting section 309A into LAws OF
Guy. ch. 8:01 (2003)).
3 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 2(2) (1950).
31 GUY. CONST. pt. II, tit. 1, art. 138(2)(a).
32 Id. art. 138(2)(b).
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a criminal offence. '31 While the use of reasonably justifiable force is a
familiar test at common law, the excepted situations themselves are broadly
drawn and arguably represent extensions of the common law. Article
138(2)(d), for example, apparently sanctions the use of reasonable force to
prevent the commission of any criminal offence, while under article 138(2)(b)
a person may be fatally shot even if he poses no threat to the apprehending
officer. These exceptions relate to factual realities that are not uncommon to
Guyanese society, and combined with Guyana's troubled socio-political
history, ought to have ensured reform of the scope of the protection of life
guarantee in the Bill of Rights. It is amazing that the Commissioners and
drafters chose to focus instead on an obscure and meaningless technicality.
C. The Right to Personal Liberty
A major feature of article 139, which confers the right to personal liberty,
is the protection conferred on criminal suspects and detainees in their
interactions with the police. Among the protections is the injunction in article
139(4), whereby any person who is arrested and detained "shall be brought
before a court as soon as is reasonably practicable. 34 While this is a useful
provision in that it directs attention to the undesirability of suspects remaining
in police custody, it is simultaneously self-defeating because of its failure to
specify a clearly defined time limit. Instead, the amorphous standard
prescribed (that is, "reasonably practicable") cloaks law enforcement with
enormous powers, which they have not recoiled from using and even abusing.
The inadequacy of this provision has not gone unnoticed. It came up for
consideration in Khan v. State,35 an appeal from four murder convictions.
Involving the murders of four young schoolboys, this case traumatised the rural
community where the murders had occurred. As the worst cases invariably do,
however, it highlights graphically the value of constitutional protections. In
their commendable zeal to solve the brutal murders, the police arrested dozens
of suspects, including the four appellants and their families. The four in
question were held without charge and without access to counsel for varying
periods ranging from four to twelve days, and in the end, they were only
charged and taken to court after they gave confession statements. Although
each appellant testified to a catalogue of violent acts inflicted against them,
11 Id. art. 138(2)(d).
34 Id. art. 139(4).
11 No. 10-13 (Guy. C.A. 1987).
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and in spite of other questionable circumstances, the trial judge rejected all
allegations of police brutality and admitted each of the confessions into
evidence. The appellants were all convicted and sentenced to death, though
two of them were subsequently freed on appeal. In spite of vigorous
arguments by defence counsel based on article 139(4), the Court of Appeal
strenuously resisted laying down any time limit which could have the effect of
circumscribing unrestricted police discretion to detain suspects in custody.36
Commenting on the admission into evidence of the confession given by the
third appellant, Justice of Appeal Kennard would only concede that:
"incarceration of this appellant for a period of four days without a charge being
laid is a practice which must be discouraged and must be frowned
upon" 37 -empty words for the two appellants who were subsequently
executed.
In partial recognition of this defect, Act 10 stipulates that suspects may be
detained no longer than seventy-two hours after arrest or detention, although
this period may be extended by the High Court upon application by the police.
While this amendment is clearly overdue, it is nonetheless inadequate and
betrays a troubling reluctance to demand uncompromising standards of police
officers. The State possesses extremely coercive powers against which the
average citizen is almost powerless in a practical setting. Within certain
parameters, a person can be arrested, detained, searched and taken into
custody, even if he or she has not committed an offence, but simply upon
reasonable suspicion of so doing. For someone who is innocent, these are
monstrous intrusions upon privacy and liberty, which are nonetheless tolerated
for the greater good. The role of the Constitution is to regulate this asymmetri-
cal relationship between the State and the individual, but it is not entirely
convincing that seventy-two hours in police custody achieves a fair balance.
The early phase of a criminal investigation is a critical period for both
suspects and investigators. Present always is the danger of improper and
illegal pressure being applied against the powerless suspect as a means to
obtain information, and this is why it is important for suspects-if they must
be detained pending trial-to be kept in the custody of the more neutral prison
setting and away from the officers conducting the actual investigation. The
alternative raises the possibility of a host of abuses-from the psychological
pressure of being kept incommunicado to the physical dangers of unlawful
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a blind eye to improper police practices, and for proof one need look no further
than British "justice" vis-t-vis Northern Ireland militants. a8
Almost as troubling is the provision of Act 10 that allows extension of
custodial detention upon application to the High Court. The procedure could
constitute a genuine review of the circumstances of the existing detention or
simply amount to a routine endorsement of a police application, but the record
of the local judiciary supports the latter possibility.
Establishing constitutional safeguards is not a weak, 'human rights'
approach to law enforcement. Rather, it forces police officers to adhere to the
laws they are sworn to enforce, and minimises the risks of forced confessions
and false convictions. These are unquestionably desirable goals, and highlight
why the amendment is arguably inadequate. Seventy-two hours is still too long
a period to be in police custody without charge, for it gives investigating
officers considerable time with a suspect. In Guyana's context, where there
is a high degree of illiteracy and unfamiliarity with rights generally, protracted
police detention alone can inspire fear and impel self-incrimination. For these
reasons, it is regrettable that Act 10 did not champion a more vigorous
approach.
D. Protection of Property and Freedom of Assembly and Association
In two specific instances, Act 10 has effected overdue reforms of the Bill
of Rights. First, the property guarantee has been amended yet again, this time
to include the requirement of prompt payment of adequate compensation for
the compulsory acquisition of property. Curiously, however, Act 10 removed
an earlier 1990 amendment to article 142 mandating that the written law
providing for compulsory acquisition itself guarantee a right of access to court
no doubt on the premise that it was otiose, as any acquisition could always be
challenged under article 142 itself.
More significantly, article 147, the protection of the freedom of assembly
and association, has been materially amended. It now includes a right to
"demonstrate peacefully," a courageous political step on the part of the
government, given the turbulence that has accompanied each of its accessions
into office. Article 147(2) now expressly protects the right to strike, and
article 147(3) enshrines the right of both employers and trade unions to enter
into collective agreements.
38 See The Guildford Four, U.K. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989, at R. v. Mcllkenny (Birmingham
Six), [1992] 2 All E.R. 417; R. v. Ward, [1992] 96 Crim. App. R. 1.
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The two reforms are both welcome. The guarantee of the right to strike
obliterates the infamous decision of Collymore v. Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago,39 whereby the right to assembly and association was held by both
the local courts and the Privy Council not to include the freedom to strike,
while the right to enter into collective agreements removes the effect of Alli v.
Attorney General of Guyana.' By these amendments, Act 10 has finally
reversed years of retardation of the Bill of Rights by common law judges.
1m. THE "NEW" RIGHTS
In addition to the specific changes to existing provisions of the Bill of
Rights, Act 10 includes several new rights, both procedural and substantive.
These are examined in turn.
A. Protection of Human Rights
The newly inserted article 154A purports to incorporate certain interna-
tional human rights treaties into domestic law-lock, stock and barrel. This
innovation was inspired by a similar provision in the new South African
Constitution,4' and was a result of the CRC stipulation that "[A]I1 Courts in
Guyana are enjoined to pay due regard to international law and to international
Conventions and Charters to which Guyana has acceded when dealing with
matters involving alleged violations of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in
the Constitution."42 Article 154A(1) accordingly provides:
Subject to paragraphs (3) and (6), every person, as contemplated
by the respective international treaties set out in the Fourth
Schedule to which Guyana has acceded is entitled to the human
rights enshrined in the said international treaties, and such rights
shall be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature,
judiciary and all organs and agencies of Government and, where
applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons and shall be
enforceable in the manner hereinafter prescribed.43
19 [1968] 12 W.I.R. 5, CAT'I; affirmed [1969] 15 W.I.R. 229, PC.
40 [1987] 41 W.I.R. 176.
41 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 39(1).
42 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, para. 9.2.3.1.
41 Seven treaties are specified in the Fourth Schedule, namely: Convention on the Rights of
the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (entered into force
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Both the CRC recommendation and its manner of implementation by article
154A are highly unusual. With its imperious language of "enjoining" the
judiciary to pay due regard to international treaties, the CRC betrayed its doubt
regarding the capacity of the courts to faithfully dispense justice, not to
mention a lack of faith in local jurisprudence. Worse still, the indolent manner
in which this recommendation was effected has all the potential of being
counter-productive. International treaties have no force unless they are
implemented in domestic law, but normally States tend to enact them on an
individual basis. Such an approach is advisable as treaties are often the result
of careful diplomatic compromises, and since they may well espouse
contradictory standards and obligations, wholesale adoption of more than one
is potentially chaotic and could provide little guidance to a local court. These
concerns, however, are wholly premature, for article 154A is a masterpiece of
legal obfuscation, and an analysis of its provisions in their entirety will reveal
how minimal its impact is likely to be.
Superficially at least, paragraph (1) has enormous potential to foster
dynamism in the interpretation and enforcement of human rights. It provides
boldly that every person is "entitled" to the rights in the named treaties, which
"shall be respected and upheld" by all branches of government. Moreover, as
these rights are enforceable against "all natural and legal persons" it thus is not
only the State that is enjoined to observe the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of others. As simple as that may seem, it represents a momentous
extension of Commonwealth Caribbean human rights jurisprudence that
generally limits the applicability of respective Bills of Rights to State bodies."
Sept. 2, 1990); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Convention Against Torture and Other Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975); International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994)
(entered into force Mar. 5, 1995).
" Even though the constitutional provisions are generally silent on this issue, and only
address the State apparatus directly in some provisions, the accepted authority for this limitation
is the dicta of Lord Diplock in Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, [ 1979]
A.C. 385, 386G-H:
Read in the light of the recognition that each of the highly diversified rights
and freedoms of the individual described in section 1 already existed, it is in
their Lordships' view clear that the protection afforded was against contraven-
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It is surely desirable to hold all citizens to the standards espoused in the
various international treaties, but given the whole of article 154A, there is little
need to debate the merits of this extension, for the impact of paragraph (1) is
effectively neutralised by the remainder of the article. Thus, while paragraph
(1) specifies that all persons are "entitled" to the human rights enshrined in the
named treaties, paragraph (2) qualifies that the "rights referred to in paragraph
(1) do not include any fundamental right under this Constitution." One can
only assume that the drafter meant that, where conflicts occur between an
international treaty and the Constitution, then the latter is to prevail, but the
actual provision is carelessly drafted and virtually nullifies the impact of
paragraph (1).
Guyana's Bill of Rights came shortly after the movement at the end of
World War II that saw the adoption of many major human rights instruments;
predictably many of these documents cover similar areas and norms relating
to fundamental human rights."5 Accordingly, the peremptory limitation of the
rights in paragraph (1) to those not covered by the Constitution will have the
practical effect of excluding many of the treaties in the Fourth Schedule
altogether! In addition, the drafters enacted a further escape clause. Paragraph
(6) provides, "The State may divest itself or otherwise limit the extent of its
obligation under any of the treaties listed in the Fourth Schedule, provided that
two-thirds of the elected members of the National Assembly46 have voted in
favour of such divestment or limitation." In other words, having given with
one hand, the State is always free to take away with the other.
The defects do not end there. Paragraph (3) of article 154A provides: "The
State shall, having regard to the socio-cultural level of the society, take
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to
achieve the progressive realization of the rights provided for in paragraph (1)."
Measures are only required given "available resources"; more importantly,
since the reasonableness of any measure is to be judged by the "socio-cultural
level of the society," there is enough maneuverability to justify any position,
including inaction. This paragraph imposes no clear or enforceable obligation
on the State and demonstrates graphically the lukewarm commitment to
international standards espoused by article 154A.
tion of those rights or freedoms by the State or by some other public authority
endowed by law with coercive powers. The Chapter is concerned with public
law, not private law.
' In spite of this, regard to international treaties would have served the purpose of keeping
Guyana abreast with evolving standards.
46 The terms "National Assembly" and "Parliament" are interchangeable.
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Article 154A also contains a separate enforcement clause, and its
supporting mechanism best demonstrates the feebleness of the entire process.
Paragraph (4) provides that, for a breach or threatened breach of any of the
paragraph (1) rights, a person may apply to the Human Rights Commission
(HRC) "for redress." What redress, then, is the HRC empowered to dispense?
The HRC was itself the fruit of the CRC process, and was established in
2001. Both structurally and substantively, however, the HRC is weak, and
recourse to it is hardly likely to confer any material advantage. An indication
of the operating uncertainties can be gleaned from a quick look at the mandate,
composition and powers of the HRC. For instance, one of the functions of the
HRC is to monitor the observance of the treaties acceded to by the government,
including those specified in the Fourth Schedule.47 However, this seems
limited by the overall mandate of the HRC, which is narrowly addressed to
monitoring compliance with laws "relating to equality of opportunity and
treatment.
4 8
This multifaceted, or some might say schizophrenic body, is tasked
simultaneously with investigative, research, policy-making, educational,
monitoring and arbitral functions, and as if that were not enough, it is itself
empowered to institute legal action on behalf of complainants "for redress."49
Yet, its composition does not indicate that it can effectively perform these
wide-ranging functions. In addition to a chairperson, the HRC consists of four
other members, chairpersons of the other constitutional commissions (the
Ethnic Relations, Women and Gender Equality, Indigenous Peoples' and
Rights of the Child Commissions). The truly astonishing feature of the HRC
then is that, aside from its chairperson, none of its membership is devoted
exclusively to human rights concerns, and by extension therefore, none need
have or is likely to have any training or expertise in human rights issues. A
practical but no less valid consideration is-given the fact that the entire
membership comprises the chairpersons of other commissions-when are they
expected to focus on the work of the HRC?
Most perplexing of all, even though article 154A(4) provides that aggrieved
persons may apply to the HRC for "redress," upon a careful scrutiny of the
provisions establishing the HRC, it does not appear that this body can in fact
grant any redress. The HRC is mandated to investigate complaints,5" but it has
47 Guy. CONST. art. 2120(1)(a).
41 ld'art. 212N(1).
49 Id. art. 2120(2).
5o Id. art. 2120(1)(g).
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no powers of subpoena or search and no powers to question witnesses or to
compel the production of documentary or other information. The HRC is
empowered to "resolve disputes," 5' but it has no power to issue binding orders
or to otherwise compel adherence to its decisions. Recourse to this severely
compromised Commission thus promises to be an exercise in futility. Despite
its uniqueness, therefore, article 154A as enacted is unlikely to enhance the
domestic enforcement of human rights.
B. Substantive Rights
The new substantive rights cover the following areas: the right to work, the
right to pension and gratuity, the right to participate in decision-making
processes of the state, equality of persons before the law, equality of birth
status, equality for women, indigenous peoples' rights, the right to free
education, the right to establish private schools, and finally the right to a harm-
free environment. 52 At first blush, all this seems rather impressive, represent-
ing a substantial improvement on Guyana's regime of human rights protection.
Au contraire, many of these new rights have the potential to bedevil constitu-
tional interpretation and enforcement. At best, these provisions are redundant;
at worst, they are poorly conceptualised and executed.
1. The Right to Pension and Indigenous Peoples' Rights
At the outset, it should be stated that not all of the new rights are without
value, and in this category fall articles 149B and 149G. Article 149B
guarantees to "every public officer.. . an absolute and enforceable right to any
pension or gratuity granted to him or her under the provision of any law or
collective agreement of any kind whatsoever." Prior to this amendment, only
constitutional public officers enjoyed an enforceable right to pension.53
Indeed, for a long time, the mistaken view was peddled that all public officers
enjoyed pension only by way of "bounty or act of grace,"54 but this view was
mercifully buried by the Court of Appeal most recently in Baird v. Private
Sector Comm'n." Delivering the judgment of the Court, Justice of Appeal
51 Id. art. 2120(1)(h).
11 Id. arts. 149A-149J.
53 Id. at arts. 213-15.
5' Baptiste v. Gen. Manager of Transp. & Harbours Dep't, No. 12 (Guy. C. A. 1982).
"[200313 LRC 41.
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Chang held that article 214 superseded the Pensions Act, so that constitutional
public officers enjoy a "provisional or presumptive" right to pension.56 This,
however, still excludes from constitutional protection other categories of
public servants who are not covered by one of the service commissions,
including employees of state corporations and other autonomous bodies such
as the Guyana Revenue Authority. The latter would be vulnerable to the
operation of the Pensions Act, section 4(1) of which provides, "No officer
shall have an absolute right to compensation for past services or to pension,
gratuity or other allowance under this Act, nor shall anything herein or in such
regulations contained limit the right of the State to dismiss any officer without
compensation."" Article 149B removes this lacuna, so that all public sector
employees now enjoy an "absolute and enforceable" right to pension.
Equally welcome, though more guarded, is article 149G, which provides,
"Indigenous peoples shall have the right to the protection, preservation and
promulgation of their languages, cultural heritage and way of life." This
guarantee is long overdue given historical injustices and present realities faced
by Guyana's indigenous peoples. Amerindians, though the original inhabitants
of this land, were displaced in the post-Columbian era, and today probably
constitute the most impoverished ethnic group in Guyana. Even so, conspicu-
ously absent from this provision is any reference to land-to which the well-
being, way of life and heritage of indigenous peoples are intimately bound. 58
Given the settled anthropological view of the special relationship between
indigenous peoples and their land, recognised and enshrined in several
treaties,59 it remains to be seen whether the consistent failure of successive
56 Id. at 49.
17 Pensions Act, LAWS OF GuY. ch. 27:02 (2003).
58 Anthropologist Rodolfo Gruenbaum, testifying before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, put it this way:
All anthropological, ethnographic studies, all documents which the indige-
nous people themselves have presented in recent years, demonstrate that the
relationship between indigenous people and the land is an essential tie which
provides and maintains the cultural identity of those peoples. One must
understand that the land is not a mere instrument of agricultural production,
but part of a geographic and social, symbolic and religious space, with which
the history and current dynamics of those peoples are linked.
This opinion is reflected in the Court's judgment. See Mayagua (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. C. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79
(2001), available at http://www.utulsa.edu/law/classes/rice/INTERAMERCT-HUMANRTS
_Mayagna.htm.
59 See, e.g., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989, I.L.O. No. 169,72 I.L.O. Official Ball, 59, available athttp://wwwl.
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governments to implement the recommendations of the Amerindian Lands
Commission regarding Amerindian lands' can be addressed via this truncated
fundamental right.
2. The Rights to Work and to Participate
Aside from articles 149B and 149G described above, one must struggle to
find any value in the remaining 'new' rights inserted by Act 10. Two of them,
in fact, seem downright meaningless. Article 149A, guaranteeing the right to
work, and article 149C, the right to participate in the decision-making
processes of the state, are reproduced from Chapter 2 of the Constitution,
which deals with "Principles and Bases of the Political, Economic and Social
System." These were products of Guyana's socialist flirtations, lifted from the
constitutions of countries such as North Korea and China, as well as the former
Republics of East Germany, Yugoslavia and the USSR.6 As laudable as these
goals may then have been, one is forced to question their current value and
relevance.
Article 149A, for instance, somewhat inscrutably provides, "No person
shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his or her right to work, that is to say, the
right to free choice of employment." The 'hindrance' contemplated seems
related to some unjustified interference, probably based on a personal
characteristic. This interpretation only highlights the superfluity of the
provision, however, as the non-discrimination guarantee already forbids acting
on the basis of personal characteristics-yet any other construction would
simply lead to absurd results. Employment is not a one-sided affair, and is
necessarily governed by the ability to work. A disgruntled employee's
'hindrance' could well be the employer's justification for unsuitability. Given
these complexities, this vague, almost vacuous provision seems to be nothing
more than window dressing destined for the obscurity enjoyed by its
predecessor.
umn.edu/humanets/instree/vlcitp.htm; O.A.S. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, art. XXIV, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Indigenous.htm; U.N. Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples E/CN.4/SUB.2/1994/2/Add. 1 (1994), available
at http:/www.unhchr.eh/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/E.Cn.4.Sub.2.RES. 1994.45.En?OpenDoc.
I The recommendation of the Amerindian Lands Commission in 1969 to grant some 128
indigenous communities title to approximately 24,000 square miles of land, together with
mineral rights to a depth of fifty feet, has yet to be fully implemented.
61 RUDOLPH JAMES & HAROLD LuTcHMAN, LAw AND THE PoLrIcAL ENvIRoNMENT IN
GUYANA 125 (1984).
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3. Public and Private Schools
Article 149H is another effete, useless provision. It guarantees a right to
free primary and secondary education-partially replicating article 27 of the
Constitution that had already provided not only free primary and secondary
education, but free tertiary education and vocational training as well. More
puzzling is article 1491, which enshrines a right to establish private schools.
That there was a perceived necessity for this to be enshrined as afundamental
right, over and above the immediate concerns of the state-funded schools
(waves of emigrating teachers, low salaries, antiquated curricula and materials)
would have been unremarkable if it did not betray an alarming ineptitude at the
highest levels to address these problems.
4. Harm-free Environment
Into the category of uselessness must surely fall article 149J, which confers
a right on all persons to "an environment that is not harmful to his or her well-
being." The article further imposes a duty on the state to protect the environ-
ment through measures aimed at preventing pollution and ecological
degradation, promoting conservation and securing the sustainable use of
natural resources.
Just a few years previously in 1996, the Environmental Protection Act was
enacted-a comprehensive framework statute aimed at the "management,
conservation, protection and improvement of the environment, the prevention
or control of pollution, the assessment of the impact of economic development
on the environment, the sustainable use of natural resources .. " and related
matters. 62 This act established the Environmental Protection Agency, which
enjoys a wide mandate, overarching authority over other regulatory bodies, and
considerable powers, including the power to conduct investigations and
inspections and the power to issue licences and permits.63 The act also created
a regime for dealing with pollution" and monitoring works and projects 65 and
it provides stiff penalties for the breach of its provisions.66
62 Environmental Protection Act, pmbl. LAWS OF GUY. ch. 20:05 (2003).
Id. § 4(2).
I ld. §§ 19-29.
See generally id. §§ 10-18 (requiring an environmental permit).
Id. at Fifth Schedule.
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Since then, the promise of this act has yet to materialise. Having changed
a number of executive directors, one of them under very cloudy circumstances,
the Agency has failed to impose emission standards for pollution, regulate the
burgeoning wildlife trade, or address the gargantuan problem of illegal
Brazilian garimpeiros brazenly engaged in the extraction of Guyana's natural
resources. These are only some of the challenges facing Guyana, albeit no
different than those of all developing countries with abundant natural resources
and a weak infrastructure. Given that a detailed and comprehensive act already
exists, what is clearly needed for Guyana's explosive situation is not more
legislation, however classified, but rather the effective implementation and
enforcement of extant laws.
5. The Equality Rights
Act 10 piles on three 'new' equality rights, relating to status, women and
equality generally. Article 149E provides for equality of status of illegitimate
children, previously guaranteed by article 30 of the Constitution in practically
the same, if not stronger, terms. Legislation enacted shortly after the 1980
Constitution came into effect sought to implement article 30 and preclude any
arguments against its unenforceability.67 All that article 149E does, therefore,
is to convert this provision into a fundamental right, but other than the change
in classification, this amendment is unlikely to have any significant practical
effect.
The same can also be said for article 149F, which guarantees equality for
women. Similarly, this right corresponds to article 29 of the Constitution,
which provided for the equality of women and men. Moreover, the Equal
Rights Act was enacted in 1990 with the specific aim of enforcing "the
principles enshrined in article 29 of the Constitution so as to secure equality
for women and for matters connected therewith." 8 The 1990 Act contains
provisions to secure equality in the workplace as well as equality of opportu-
nity overall in political, economic and social life.69 Combined with the original
article 40, which introduced the fundamental rights and freedoms to be enjoyed
irrespective of sex, it is difficult to see how, prior to Act 10, women could have
been constitutionally subject to any form of discrimination.
67 Children Born Out of Wedlock (Removal of Discrimination) Act, No. 12 (1983) (Guy.).
68 Equal Rights Act, pmbl, LAWS OF GUY. ch. 38:01 (2003); see also Prevention of
Discrimination Act, LAWS OF GUY. ch. 99:09 (2003).
9 Equal Rights Act, §§ 2-3, LAws OFGUY. ch. 38:01 (2003).
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Curiously, Act 10 itself has substantially amended article 149, the non-
discrimination guarantee, by expanding the forbidden grounds of discrimina-
tion to include birth, marital status, sex and gender. Add the original articles
29 and 30, as well as the specific acts dealing with illegitimate children7" and
equal rights,7' and the result is a formidable body of both constitutional
dictates and ordinary legislation enshrining equality of status for women and
illegitimate children. In this context, the insertion of two further articles
devoted to these groups was undoubtedly repetitive and unnecessary.
The last and most problematic of the new rights is article 149D, paragraph
(1) of which provides, "The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or equal protection and benefit of the law." Given the multiplicity of
constitutional provisions and other enactments dealing with equality and non-
discrimination, many of which have been alluded to above, the central issue is
what, if anything, this 'new' right adds.
Some guidance may be had from the Singapore Constitution, article 12(1)
of which similarly provides, "All persons are equal before the law and entitled
to the equal protection of the law."72 This provision came up for interpretation
in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,73 a decision of the Privy Council on
appeal from Singapore, where their Lordships described article 12(1) as an
"anti-discriminatory provision."74
Significantly, article 149D's "protection of the law" is qualified by the
word "equal," so this possibly covers a different concept from that relating to
access to court as espoused in Kent Garment Factory and related cases,7"
capturing instead the specific notion of procedural equality. As for the clause
"equal... benefit of the law," this seems to import the concept of substantive
equality, that is, requiring equality in the content of laws. Bearing in mind
these meanings, one is forced to question the purpose of article 149D, given
that the unamended Constitution already prohibited both procedural and
substantive discrimination76 and contained provisions to secure due process.77
The issue raised is not merely redundancy. With the inclusion of multiple
equality and non-discrimination provisions in the reformed Bill of Rights, the
70 Children Born Out of Wedlock (Removal of Discrimination) Act, No. 12 (1983) (Guy.).
71 Equal Rights Act, LAWS OF Guy. ch. 38:01 (2003).
' SINGAPORE CONST., art. 12(1).
13 [1981] A.C. 648.
14 Id. at 670.
' See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
76 GuY. CONST. art. 149.
" GuY. CONST. art. 144.
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drafters have unleashed the danger of inconsistent standards and confusion in
the application and enforcement of the various guarantees. Is article 149D
meant to go beyond article 149, which already prohibits discrimination on
certain clearly specified grounds? Put another way, does it make all legislative
classifications illegal, and not simply those painstakingly enumerated in article
149(2)? If the answer to this question is no, then article 149D serves no
apparent purpose; if yes, then some test has to be fashioned to address equality
claims under the provision.
An indication of the complexity of the latter exercise can be gleaned from
Ong Ah Chuan.78 In this case, the appellant was found in possession of a
prohibited drug in such quantities as to raise the statutory presumption of
trafficking. He was convicted of trafficking in narcotics and sentenced to
death. In the Privy Council, he raised the argument that the mandatory death
sentence for trafficking in or over the stipulated amount violated the principle
of equality before the law under article 12(1) of the Constitution. At issue,
therefore, was the validity of the distinction made on the basis of the quantity
of the drug possessed. In considering this submission, their Lordships held
that equality requires that like should be treated alike. Delivering the judgment
of the Board, Lord Diplock explained, "What article 12(1) of the Constitution
assures to the individual is the right to equal treatment with other individuals
in similar circumstances." What difference in circumstances would justify
differential treatment? Lord Diplock's tortuous answer was:
The questions whether this dissimilarity in circumstances
justifies any differentiation in the punishments imposed upon
individuals who fall within one class and those who fall within
the other, and, if so, what are the appropriate punishments for
each class, are questions of social policy. Under the Constitu-
tion, which is based on the separation of powers, these are
questions which it is the function of the legislature to decide, not
that of the judiciary. Provided that the factor which the legisla-
ture adopts as constituting the dissimilarity in circumstances is
not purely arbitrary but bears a reasonable relation to the social
object of the law, there is no inconsistency with article 12(1) of
the Constitution.79
78 Ong Ah Chuan, [1981] A.C. at 673.
19 Id. at 673-74.
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This is hardly a satisfactory approach, for it creates more questions than
answers. Two points may be noted. First, Lord Diplock pretends to subscribe
to the doctrine of separation of powers, but still subjects the reasonableness of
the differentiating factor to judicial scrutiny. This is not necessarily a bad
thing, but Lord Diplock does not take this to its logical conclusion. Instead,
the "social object of the law" seems to be accepted as a given, so that absent
arbitrariness in the differentiating factor, there can be no finding of unconstitu-
tional treatment. With respect, this seems to make the provision a rather
toothless weapon.8"
These are all issues of great subtlety that admit of no easy answer. Article
149D is nothing short of disastrous, and carries with it the seeds of chaos in the
interpretation and application of the plethora of non-discrimination and
equality provisions in Guyana's reformed Bill of Rights.
IV. THE OMISSIONS
A. General
Act 10 purports to address some aspects of the fundamental rights regime
in the Constitution but inexplicably ignores others. For example, as discussed
above, the act fails to address the anomalies in the right to life provision that
seriously undermine the level of protection accorded by this right. Other areas
can be briefly mentioned. Article 139, which guarantees the right to personal
liberty, is flawed in several respects, such as the wide scope of its authorised
exceptions that include preventive detention for periods of up to three months,
and which exempt a person from protection if he is "reasonably suspected to
be of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose
of his care or treatment or the protection of the community."8 The interpreta-
tion of the right to counsel, a protection that is pivotal to a suspect's defence,
has confounded the courts and ought to have been clarified along with other
rights pertaining to the treatment of suspects.82
Another area that demands urgent legislative intervention relates to the
prohibition against inhumane and degrading punishment. Article 141 of the
go See DEMERIEUX, supra note 17, at 413-52 (providing a detailed discussion of these
issues).
GUY. CONST. art. 139(l)(k), (h).
2 See generally Arif Bulkan, Defining the Meaning and Scope of the Right to Counsel
Enshrined in the 1980 Guyana Constitution, 3 GuY. L. REv. 151 (2002).
[Vol. 32:613
GUYANA'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REFORMS
Constitution contains a specific savings clause that authorises punishments
existing at the entry into force of the Constitution. While this operates to save
the death penalty, the implementation of the penalty is an entirely different
matter and Guyanese jurisprudence diverges significantly from that of its
Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours.8 3 Although the interpretation of article
141 is, to an extent, settled law in Guyana, the executive has been clearly
reluctant to enforce capital punishment, and in the interim, dozens of convicted
men who have exhausted their appeals remain trapped in a Kafkaesque
nightmare awaiting execution. This was another opportunity squandered by
the CRC.
By far the most significant omission of Act 10, however, concerns the non-
discrimination guarantee, the source of all the initial controversy. The CRC
being so clearly preoccupied by equality issues, it is regrettable that its most
original recommendation did not come to fruition. These issues are examined
in greater detail below.
B. Protection from Discrimination
As it appears in the current 1980 Constitution, the non-discrimination
provision takes the standard form that obtains in constitutions around the
Commonwealth Caribbean, barring, significantly, that of Trinidad and Tobago.
In Article 149, both discriminatory laws and discriminatory treatment by the
state and by public officers are prohibited, subject to certain exceptions
relating to non-citizens, Amerindians and various matters relating to personal
law. The essence of discrimination, however-as certain academics and
judges have been at pains to point out84-is not merely different treatment, but
different treatment motivated by some impermissible ground or factor.
Consequently, what is of central importance in assessing the scope of the
guarantee are those very prohibited grounds or factors. Clearly, the wider or
more flexible they are, the more tolerant the society is likely to be.
In Guyana, those prohibited grounds were listed in the unamended article
149(2) somewhat narrowly as "race, place of origin, political opinions, colour
13 In the Commonwealth Caribbean, by virtue of Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica,
[1993] 3 W.L.R. 995 (Privy Council), a delay of more than five years in the execution of a
capital sentence renders that sentence cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional, but this
time period was expressly rejected by the Guyana Court of Appeal in Yaseen v. Attorney General
of Guyana, No. 19-20 (Guy. C.A. 1996).
84 See DEMERIEUX, supra note 17, at 416; Nielsen v. Barker, [1982] 32 WIR. 254 (Massiah
C., dictum).
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or creed." Clearly influenced by the reformed South African Constitution,"
in its report the CRC recommended amending article 149(2) to widen the
prohibited grounds of discrimination to include sexual orientation in addition
to the usual ones of race, religion, gender and so on. This recommendation
was faithfully incorporated into the initial draft, only to be later abandoned in
the face of vociferous, sectarian opposition.
Sadly, this capitulation by the government is not as trivial as some might
think. Respect for civil liberties, as history has repeatedly demonstrated,
cannot operate selectively. The moment that governments pick and choose
who is entitled to protection, all minorities become vulnerable, and in order to
appreciate the force of this proposition, one need only reflect on the fact that
Hitler's intolerance was not reserved for Jews but that thousands of homosexu-
als were subject to unspeakable abuses and also exterminated in the Third
Reich. 6 A less dramatic, though no less real, consequence of tolerating
disrespect for rights and due process is the corrupting influence that such an
attitude can spawn, as we have vividly witnessed in Guyana in recent times.
The "Phantom Force," initially tolerated, even celebrated in some quarters, did
not confine itself solely to dispensing vigilante justice, and inevitably
graduated from "liberators" to mercenaries for hire. 7 At higher levels, the
disregard displayed towards gays and lesbians by the rejection of the
constitutional amendment is not an isolated manifestation of the government's
political caution, but is in fact symptomatic of its ambivalent approach to the
protection and enforcement of fundamental rights. The People's Progressive
Party (PPP's) term has witnessed draconian legislation entailing significant
incursions into civil liberties, such as statutes extending the death penalty" and
restricting the liberty of citizens forcibly repatriated for overseas convictions,89
and currently a Broadcasting Bill is pending in Parliament that has enormous
potential for censorship and the curtailing of media freedom and free speech.
Legislative illiberalism has been paralleled by executive inaction on problems
concerning extrajudicial executions and the implementation of the death
85 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 9.
86 K. Peper, Triangles and Community Pride, NETWORK, June 1994, at 50.
"' In 2002 a vicious crime wave erupted across Georgetown and certain rural areas, in which
Indo-Guyanese were specifically targeted. In the face of inaction by the authorities, a "Phantom
Force" funded by besieged businessmen and tacitly encouraged by the government came into
being, with its members carrying out private assassinations of known or suspected criminals. See
Body of Evidence on Death Squad, SUNDAY STABROEK, Mar. 7, 2004, at 16.
88 Criminal Law (Offences) Act § 309A, LAWS OF GUY., ch. 8:01 (2003).
" Prevention of Crimes Act §§ 3A, 6A, LAWS OFGUY., ch. 9:01 (2003).
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penalty, leading to the conclusion that even though there was a so-called
'return to democracy' in 1992, democracy must have some measure of
autochthony, as opposed to being imposed by foreign creditors, in order to
flourish.
It would be apposite to make two observations at this point. First, the
existence of homosexuality (and, by extension, the necessity for homosexual
equality) is not a foreign or Western phenomenon unrelated to local realities.
The pervasiveness of homosexuality has been observed across cultures,
egalitarian to hierarchical, across species, from human beings to fruit flies, and
across time, from Ancient Greek and pre-Columbian indigenous civilizations
to modern societies.' Second, the lack of prominence of homosexual issues
in Guyana's society does not minimize the importance or necessity for reform.
Discrimination exists in all spheres-from laws that criminalize consensual
sexual activities between males 9' to civil laws that discriminate in all the usual
areas relating to property and family law. In the remaining two sections, this
Article outlines briefly some of the innovative juridical developments across
the world that have advanced the cause of homosexual equality, before finally
examining the arguments that apparently persuaded the president to drop the
sexual orientation clause from article 149.
1. Juridical Developments
As an indication of the marginalisation of homosexuals, none of the
international or major regional human rights instruments enshrine sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Nonetheless, this silence
has not succeeded in retarding the articulation of homosexual rights in many
parts of the world, as even the most cursory survey would demonstrate.
Most notable must be the interpretation given to article 26 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) as forbidding discrimination on the
ground of sexual orientation, on the basis that "sex" includes sexual orienta-
tion. 92 Additionally, the UNHRC found that the anti-sodomy laws of Tasmania
' N. McKenna, On the Margins: Men Who Have Sex with Men in the Developing World,
quoted in HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS ON HIV/AIDS, LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 55 (1999);
BRUCE BAGEMIHL, BIOLOGICAL EXUBERANCE: ANIMAL HOMOSEXUALITY AND NATURAL
DIVERSITY (1999); Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 3,
1993, at 47.
"t Criminal Law (Offences) Act, LAWS OF Guy. ch. 8:01 (2003).
92 Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
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violated the right to privacy enshrined in article 17 of the ICCPR.9 3 As pointed
out by Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court, the importance of
this decision, coming as it does from a "high body of the United Nations,"
extends far beyond Tasmania and "speaks to the whole world."'94 Ironically,
not only has Guyana acceded to the ICCPR, but Act 10 itself has incorporated
it into Guyana's domestic law in its entirety.95
In the European Union, a progressive approach to these issues was
embraced long before 1992. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,96 at issue were
the laws of Northern Ireland that criminalized homosexual acts between
consenting adult men in private. In an earlier drug raid, the police had seized
the personal papers of the applicant, thereby discovering private accounts of
his homosexual activities. As a result, he was arrested and suffered the
indignity of over four hours of questioning about his sex life, and though no
charges were ultimately laid, he eventually instituted an action. In ruling for
the applicant, the European Court found that the anti-sodomy laws constituted
an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life under
article 8 of the ECHR.97 The court's enlightened attitude towards homosexual-
ity, and its robust rejection of private morality as ajustification for differential
treatment of homosexuals, was very much evident in its judgment. According
to the majority, "the moral attitudes towards male homosexuality in Northern
Ireland and the concern that any relaxation in the law would tend to erode
existing moral standards cannot, without more, warrant interfering with the
applicant's private life to such an extent."9' Since then, various member states
within the European Union have granted equal rights to same-sex couples in
a host of areas, ranging from property and social security to even marriage and
immigration. 99
40, Vol. 2, at 226, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
93 id.
9" Michael J. Kirby, Homosexual Law Reform: The Road of Enlightenment, 6 AUSTL GAY
& LESBIAN L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
9 Guy. CONST. art. 154A.
9 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981).
9 See also Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988).
98 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 61.
9 See Danish Registered Partnership Act, 1989, D/341-H-ML Act 372 (June 1, 1989).
Further, the Netherlands is one of the few countries worldwide where homosexuals may legally
marry, while out of a dozen countries that recognise same-sex relationships for immigration
purposes, eight are European. Michael Kirby, Sexuality and Australian Law, Address Before
the International Bar Association Conference (Oct. 18,2000), at http://www.lawfoundation.net.
au/resources/kirby/papers/20001018_sexuality.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
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A jurisdiction that has blazed the trail for homosexual equality over the past
decade is South Africa. Their 1996 Constitution was the first in the world to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination,"°° and this
precipitated dramatic legal reforms. One of the earliest cases concerned a
successful challenge by the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
against the common law offence of sodomy as well as various statutory
offences penalising sodomy and sexual relations between men. °'0 The
Constitutional Court held that these laws violated the constitutional guarantees
of both equality and privacy. 2 The court reasoned that since the various
provisions penalised conduct that caused no harm to anyone else, and since
their only purpose was to criminalize conduct that failed to conform to the
moral and religious views of a section of society, they were presumptively
unfair and a breach of the equality guarantee.'0 3 According to Ju Sachs, "the
violation of equality by the anti-sodomy laws is all the more egregious because
it touches the deep, invisible and intimate side of people's lives, while the
discriminatory manner in which groups are targeted by invasions of privacy
will destroy any possibility of justification for such invasions.""
More recent reforms in South Africa have spanned the areas of immigra-
tion, 1 5 social security'06 and even the contentious area of adoption. In Du Toit
v. Minister for Welfare and Population Dev.,'07 it was held that the relevant
provisions of the law that excluded same-sex life partners from the right to
adoptjointly discriminated unfairly against the appellants, a lesbian couple, on
the ground of their sexual orientation, and was accordingly unconstitutional.
Canadian equality jurisprudence has equalled, and in some instances even
surpassed, developments elsewhere regarding the rights of sexual minorities.
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, °' in its
prohibition of discriminatory laws and treatment, makes no mention of sexual
100 S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 9(3).





'05 In Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs, [2000] 3
C.H.R.L.D. 39, it was held that the refusal of immigration permits to same-sex life partners of
residents was unconstitutional.
" Satchwell v. President of the Republic of South Africa, [2003] 4 C.H.R.L.D. 18.
'10 [2003] 4 C.H.R.L.D. 21.
Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, (U.K.) 1982 c.11.
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orientation, but in Egan v. Canada,"9 the Canadian Supreme Court held that
sexual orientation is nonetheless an "analogous ground," meaning that
discrimination on this basis is also forbidden. An interesting application of
Egan occurred in Vriend v. Alberta,10 which concerned a constitutional
challenge to the 1980 Individual Rights Protection Act of Alberta. In this case,
the appellant was dismissed from his employment at a private Christian college
in Alberta after he disclosed his homosexuality. His application to the Alberta
Human Rights Commission under the 1980 Act was refused on the simple
ground that the act did not include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground
of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada, ruling in the applicant's
favour, found that the act violated section 15(1) of the Charter by failing to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination."' The
reasoning of the majority was that the Alberta statute denied gays and lesbians
the equal protection of the law simply on the basis of a personal characteristic
regarded as analogous to the grounds enumerated in section 15(l).112 Given
that there was no rational connection between the goal of protecting persons
from discrimination and the exclusion of homosexuals from the impugned
provisions of the Act, there was no justification for the rights violation.
According to Cory, writing for the majority, the exclusion of sexual orientation
from the Act's protection sends a "strong and sinister message" that
"discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is not as serious, or as
deserving of condemnation, as other forms of discrimination. It could well be
said that it is tantamount to condoning or even encouraging discrimination
against lesbians and gay men."'' 3
Other areas of reform in Canada range over diverse matters from spousal
security 114 to educational issues. In Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board"5 a
ban on three kindergarten books depicting same-sex relationships was held to
be unconstitutional. The ruling stemmed from the religious motivations for the
ban; the Supreme Court emphasized that the public school system had to be
run on a strictly secular basis, but the emphasis does not undermine the
'09 [1995] 124 D.L.R. 609 (Can.).




'4 In Attorney General of Ontario v. M., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, the exclusion of same-sex
couples from maintenance provisions on the dissolution of a union was held to violate section
15(1) and therefore unconstitutional.
'. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710.
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ruling's implications for homosexual equality. According to McLachlin,
"[p]arental views, however important, cannot override the imperatives placed
upon the British Columbia public schools to mirror the diversity of the
community and teach tolerance and understanding of difference.' ' 6 No single
development, however, has been more symbolic or revolutionary than Halpern
v. Attorney General of Canada,"7 where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that
the common law definition of marriage as "the voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others" excluded same-sex
marriages and thereby violated section 15(1). In arriving at this conclusion,
the Court reasoned that this exclusion could not be justified solely for the
purposes of procreation or companionship, and since it also demeaned the
dignity of same-sex couples, the objective of the law was not pressing and
substantial and therefore could not be justified in a free and democratic
society. Accordingly, the common law definition of marriage would be
reformulated as "the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion
of all others."' 8
Other jurisdictions have not lagged far behind. In Australia, for example,
the Toonen ruling of the UNHRC led to the amendment of the Criminal Code
in Tasmania repealing the offence of sodomy as committed by males, the last
state in the Commonwealth of Australia that espoused such discriminatory
laws. Like the European experience, this foreshadowed changes to other areas
of the law. For example, in New South Wales, Australia's most populous
state, a comprehensive statute in 1999 extended rights to homosexual couples,
previously enjoyed only by heterosexual couples, including both property
rights in the areas of succession, taxation, insurance and family provision, as
well as symbolic non-property rights granting the power to make decisions
regarding medical treatment, guardianship and even mental health." 9 This
statute was followed in other states such as Queensland, and similar bills are
under consideration elsewhere. Same-sex relationships have been given equal
prominence at the federal level, and since 1984 amendments to the immigra-
tion laws have given non-Australian partners of Australian citizens expanded
rights of entry into the country.' 20
116 Id.
11 [2003] 3 L.R.C. 558.
IS d.
" Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (N.S.W. Stat.) (Austl.).
20 Kirby, supra note 99.
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In the United States, a watershed decision of their Supreme Court in 2003
struck down discriminatory legislation in Texas targeting homosexuals, paving
the way for the dismantling of similar laws across the country. In Lawrence
v. Texas, 2' the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas statute
which criminalized sodomy between two persons of the same sex. Interest-
ingly, the majority, minus Justice O'Connor, did not rest its decision solely on
the equal protection clause, pointing out that if so the prohibition could be
validated if restructured to prohibit homosexual as well as heterosexual
participants. Instead, they found broadly that the criminalisation of private,
consensual sexual activity that caused no harm violated the liberty of the
individual as protected by the due process clause. The petitioners-two adult
men who were discovered engaged in sexual activity in their own home by the
police whilst investigating another, unrelated report-were held to be entitled
to respect for their private lives. The majority said, "The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making private sexual conduct a
crime. '
At the state level, even more momentous developments have taken place in
the United States post-Lawrence. In November 2003, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruled that a ban on same-sex marriages offended individual
liberty and equality under the Massachusetts Constitution, and ordered the
legislature to reform the relevant laws accordingly. 2 a The state legislature in
turn enacted a law granting same-sex couples the right to enter into 'civil
unions' with all the benefits, rights and responsibilities of marriage, though it
stopped short of calling such this union a 'marriage.' This took care of the
discrimination against same-sex partnerships seeking equal benefits with their
heterosexual counterparts, or so the legislature thought-after all, a rose by
any other name smells as sweet. Not so, responded the Massachusetts
Supreme Court. In an advisory opinion given at the request of the Massachu-
setts Senate on the constitutionality of the proposed law, the majority stated
that nothing short of a right to marry would eliminate the discrimination faced
by same-sex couples and purge the extant laws of their unconstitutionality.
24
Evident from the majority's reasoning was the desire to achieve substantive
121 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 Id.
,2 Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
'2' Opinion of the Justices to the Senate (Feb. 3, 2004), at http://www.boston.comnews/
specials/gay-marriagesjc_020404/.
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equality for homosexual couples, and remove the hypocrisy of labels such as
'civil unions' that immediately brand the participants second-class.
No doubt, this is not the final word on the subject, as even now Massachu-
setts legislators are considering an amendment to their state's constitution to
ban same-sex marriages. Indeed, the issue will occupy both state and federal
authorities as no less than the president has indicated his support for an
amendment to the federal constitution to ban same-sex marriages. However,
the possibility of some setbacks in Massachusetts and the U.S. as a whole does
not diminish the magnitude of Lawrence and the importance of these
developments. After hundreds of years of entrenched statutory discrimination
against homosexuals, the process of reform has begun in what is surely an
irreversible tide. The question is no longer whether American jurisprudence
will emulate other Western democracies, but how soon.
Clearly these are only samples of the changes to legal rules on issues
concerning homosexual equality, but they demonstrate several important
points. First, reform has not been isolated but has occurred across jurisdictions
spanning considerable geographic distances and cultural differences. The
historic silence of human rights instruments has not been sufficient to foreclose
change, and the enthusiasm of countries like South Africa in embracing change
is pivotal in eradicating the visceral prejudices that have traditionally stymied
reform.. Second, reforms have not been confined simply to dismantling
criminal sanctions against certain private behaviours, but have addressed a host
of concerns ranging from property to insurance to family law issues to social
security and so on. This reinforces the oft-overlooked fact that homosexual
equality is not simply about carnal matters, but relates also to fundamental
issues of personhood and the quotidian concerns that occupy any individual.
As many of the judges have made clear, the reforms seek to achieve not mere
equality, but the restoration of dignity, liberty and autonomy to a community
of people long marginalized. These are the considerations that ought to have
guided Guyana's legislators; instead, without any reasoned debate, the sexual
orientation clause was dropped from Act 10 and is, for all intents and purposes,
buried in a separate bill that is likely never to see the light of day.
2. The Tyrant's Will
In Guyana, since neither the president nor his legal advisers articulated their
objections to implementing fully the recommendations of their own Commis-
sion, one is left merely with the demagoguery of the religious interest groups
who were responsible for fuelling resistance to homosexual equality in the first
2004]
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place. Their objection to the amendment in question was purportedly rooted
in religious doctrine. According to their interpretations of the Bible (and other
sacred texts), homosexuality is an "abomination" and "sinful," which therefore
precludes any constitutional changes that remove or threaten to remove legal
sanctions and open the door to same-sex marriages. In their own words:
The Guyanese religious community . . . is equally united and
unanimous based on the teachings and sacred writings of all our
traditions, that it is God's will, in his creation of humanity, that
sexual intercourse, an image of God's own power of creation,
should be practiced only within the context of marriage between
members of the opposite sex. 25
This statement is not only internally false; it also fails to provide any legal
justification for state-sanctioned discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation.
In the first place and contrary to the above claims, the Guyanese religious
community was not united in its view of the proposed amendment. The debate
on this issue was hijacked by key figures in the Evangelical movement, out of
which the most noxious vitriol emanated, but even amidst the resulting hysteria
there were voices of reason. Bishop Singh, the Head of the Roman Catholic
Church in Guyana, called on Christians not to oppose the proposed amend-
ment, stating: "The Church is ... opposed to discrimination based on sexual
orientation and supports legislation intended to enshrine this as a fundamental
right."' 26 Bishop Singh adverted to comments previously released in a Pastoral
letter, in which he had stated:
Most of us, whether we find ourselves sexually attracted to the
opposite sex or our own sex, did not choose one or the other: we
simply discovered that is how we are. Homosexual persons are
sexually attracted solely to their own gender. There is strong
evidence that their orientation is fixed early in life (in many cases
before birth), and it is totally outside of their control. Experience
has taught us that no therapy or counselling can change it.'27
' United Religious Position on Rights Bill (on file with author).
'2 CATHOLIC STANDARD, July 25, 2003, at 1.
127 CATHOLIC STANDARD, Jan. 1, 2001, at 1.
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Although the release reiterated the traditional (and some would say, hypocriti-
cal and unrealistic) position of 'hate the sin, love the sinner,' it is remarkable
both for its acknowledgement of the immutable nature of sexual orientation
and too for its courageous stance against the bigotry of the Evangelical
community.
This disunity amongst the local Christian community is instructive, for as
this and similar debates are replayed in other religions, it demonstrates
graphically the inability of religious doctrine to provide a coherent basis for
legislation. Common problems of language, translation and context present
formidable challenges to interpretation, and call for considerable skill in
navigating what is a semantic and linguistic quagmire. Gareth Moore, a
Dominican priest and professor of theology and philosophy at Oxford
University, has scrutinised the language and context of the Scriptures to show
how traditional interpretations are fallacious and irrational, and argues that
there are no cogent Biblical arguments against same-sex relationships.
Regarding the story of Sodom and Gomorrah, often cited in this context,
Professor Moore agrees that it refers to homosexuality, but argues that it was
about attempted homosexual rape and therefore cannot be a condemnation of
all homosexual acts (in the same way that condemnation of heterosexual rape
cannot be a condemnation of all heterosexual acts).'28
Dr. Remert Truluck, an American Baptist preacher and former professor of
religion, takes an even more controversial position on the Sodom and
Gomorrah story. He argues that the six main Biblical passages often used to
condemn homosexuality have all been incorrectly translated and misinter-
preted. 29 In support of his thesis, he presents many examples of how
translations from the Greek to English, as well as the evolution of English
itself, served to transform, sometimes radically so, the meaning of whole
passages. 30 Most famously, the word "know" appears 243 times in the Old
Testament in various contexts, such as to "know" God, good and evil, the truth,
law, people, places, and things, and based on this thematic examination, he
concludes that the word simply means "know" and nowhere does it have the
sexual connotation that has been consistently (and incorrectly) attributed to
it.' 3 ' It is this incorrect translation, he argues, that has led to a misinterpreta-
128 GARETH MOORE, A QUESTION OF TRUTH: CHRISTIANITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY (2003).
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tion of the infamous story of Lot and Sodom. Dr. Truluck posits, "No Jewish
scholars before the first Christian century thought the sin of Sodom was
sexual. None of the Biblical references to Sodom mention sexual sins but view
Sodom as an example of injustice, lack of hospitality to strangers and
idolatry.' 132
Interestingly, as Islamic doctrines are subject to similar scrutiny, the same
confusion rages over the meaning of words and passages. Adopting different
techniques of interpretation of Qur'anic verses, Islamic scholar Dr. Scott Kugle
argues that the equation of divine punishment of Lut's people (that is, Lot of
the Old Testament) with a condemnation of homosexuality is a dubious
conclusion. 133 Kugle demonstrates how both thematic readings of Qur'anic
passages and semantic examinations of particular words cast ambiguity on
traditional interpretations of the story, and asserts in terms strikingly similar
to Dr. Truluck's, "The narrative [of Lut] is clearly about infidelity through
inhospitality and greed, rather than about sex acts in general or sexuality of any
variation in particular.', 134
In fact, Dr. Kugle mounts a radical attack on traditional interpretations, and
argues that Islam does not address homosexuality. In support, he states that no
punishment is specified for same-sex behaviour, nor is there even any word
that means 'homosexual' in the Qur'an. The closest the Qur'an comes to
mentioning homosexuals is by speaking of "men who are not in need of
women," but even this phrase is used descriptively and without condemnation
or other negative connotation.'35 Dr. Kugle concludes that far from condemn-
ing homosexuality, Islam "acknowledges and respects diversity in sexuality
and sexual practices.' 36
Ultimately, as these debates make clear, many of the sacred texts were
written by humans, and are therefore subject to interpretation by humans.
Factor in the various translations of these texts and the changes in language
and context to which they have been subject over centuries, and ambiguity in
meaning becomes not merely understandable, but unavoidable. This, however,
presents a critical dilemma for those fundamentalists and Parliamentarians who
would legislate on the basis of religious doctrine, and that is, if the texts
132 Id.
"3 Scott Kugle, Sexuality and Sexual Ethics in the Agenda of Progressive Muslims, in
VOICES OF PROGRESSIVE MUsLIMS: TowARDS AN AuTHENTIC ENGAGEMENT WITH MODERNITY
(0. Safi ed., 2003).
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themselves are not unequivocal on the subject of human sexuality, how can
they in turn be invoked to justify laws that seek to regulate sexual behaviour?
An important dimension of the arguments based on religion is that, even
assuming unanimity of interpretation of religious doctrine, there is no clearly
discernible link between religion and law. This contradicts common
perceptions and even academic opinion, 37 but in truth, amongst the elaborate
structure of civil and criminal laws that regulate our lives, one will struggle in
vain to find any underlying Christian morality or Biblical sentiment. Where,
for example, are the Christian values in the trade, finance and banking rules
that disproportionately benefit Western governments, which relegate much of
the developing world to abject poverty?1 31 Or the Christian values in the
skewed intellectual property regime that allows corporate monoliths to profit
at the expense of local and indigenous knowledge? In the criminal field, one
often assumes, like Rostow, a more direct link between Christian morality and
law, but this cannot withstand serious scrutiny. According to the Reverend Dr.
Walter Wink, in only four out of twenty areas of sexual behaviour (incest,
rape, bestiality and adultery) do Biblical and modem values coincide. 39 Of
those four areas, adultery is not proscribed by law, and the glaring fact is that
much of what the Bible (apparently) condemns finds no expression in our laws.
Equally, many Biblically condoned practices such as polygamy, concubinage
and levirate marriage are not only viewed with revulsion in our societies, they
are expressly forbidden.
Moreover, the Bible does not reserve its harsh penalties for sexual
transgressions, but is replete with other savage and barbaric punishments.'
40
It contains sundry laws relating to personal hygiene, clothing and diet that are
completely ignored even by the faithful. Perhaps the best indicator of the
social distance society has travelled since Biblical times is provided by
Deuteronomy 21:18-21, which orders that a "stubborn and rebellious son" is
to be stoned to death. It is thus an exercise in futility to discern Christian
philosophy as the rationale for our laws, sexual or otherwise, the vast bulk of
3 See Eugene V. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 197
(opining, "Men often say that one cannot legislate morality. I should say that we legislate hardly
anything else.").
"I A discussion of the realities of international trade can be found in The Unkept Promise,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2003, at A20.
I" Walter Wink, Homosexuality and the Bible, Nov. 1, 1998, at http://www.melwhite.org/
biblesays.html (last visited May 4, 2004).
40 E.g., Exodus 35:2 (death for working on the Sabbath); Leviticus 20:10 (death for adultery);
Leviticus 24:14-16 (death by stoning for blasphemy).
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which have more to do with the preservation of order and the prevention of
harm than with any elusive religious dogma. Advancing religious justification
for modem legislation is thus simply an affront to secular traditions.
The issue of morality in general, as opposed to specifically Christian or
other religious doctrine, raises questions of an altogether more subtle kind.
Legal philosophers have long debated the relationship of law and morality, and
this discourse is relevant given the tenor of arguments propounded by the
evangelical community. As long ago as 1859, John Stuart Mill, in his
celebrated essay, On Liberty, cautioned, "[t]he only purpose for which power
can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant."' 1 This philosophy endured long enough to
influence the Wolfenden Committee, set up to investigate homosexual offences
and prostitution in the United Kingdom almost 100 years later. In their report,
delivered in 1957, the Commissioners stated, "Unless a deliberate attempt is
to be made by society, acting through the agency of the law, to equate the
sphere of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality
and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business."' 42
These recommendations eventually led to the decriminalisation of prostitution
in the United Kingdom, as well as the legalisation of homosexual acts between
consenting adults over age twenty-one in private.
Nonetheless, a provocative take on the Wolfenden Report came from the
distinguished English judge Lord Devlin, who posited direly that "any
immorality is capable of affecting society injuriously."' 43 According to his
'social cohesion theory,' all societies have a shared morality which is
weakened-to the point of ultimate destruction-by acts of immorality, even
if committed in private and harming no one but the actor himself. Society's
own preservation, therefore, demands the enforcement of the moral views of
the majority.1" Arguably, however, this theory is neither logically nor
empirically sound. There is, to begin with, a prerequisite of identifying this
'shared morality,' and the preceding sketch of divergent religious views
indicate the difficulties that await any such exercise. As to whether any shared
morality can exist in our modem, heterogeneous societies is another even more
141 J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 116-17 (1980) (quoting Mill).
I42 d. at 118-19 (quoting the Wolfenden Committee).
1 Patrick Devlin, Morals in the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 15
(Patrick Devlin ed., 1965).
1'4 id.
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difficult question. Finally, practical considerations of immense proportions
await the protection of any existing shared morality, as that would entail the
impossible task of policing private acts.
In any event, assuming the existence of homogenous societies and of some
minimum 'shared morality' therein, one is forced to question why its
preservation should be a sine qua non to continued survival-particularly
when the history of civilization has been one of continual adaptation and
change. Indeed, what Lord Devlin overlooks is that the majority is not
necessarily right, and it is entirely possible for tradition or common prejudices
to be passed off as morality. Dr. Kugle points out that evolving interpretations
of the Qur'an have precipitated the demise of practices in Islamic societies
relating to monarchical rule, slavery and the treatment of women, without
accompanying societal disintegration, leading rather to the strengthening of
religious belief. 4 Indeed, as the European Court wryly observed in Dudgeon,
even though the law concerning private homosexual acts between consenting
males had not been enforced in Northern Ireland, no evidence was provided of
how this might have negatively impacted the society.'46
Biological and scientific evidence present even more of a problem for Lord
Devlin's thesis. Biologists and anthropologists have documented homosexual
behaviour in every species and in every culture from the beginning of recorded
history. In what represented a groundbreaking study for its time, U.S.
psychologist Alfred Kinsey demonstrated that homosexuality is "surprisingly
common across lines of family, class, education and geographic
background."'4 More recently, a fascinating angle on the implications of
Kinsey's results has been developed by the research of Stanford professor of
biology Dr. Joan Roughgarden. Examining Darwin's evolutionary theory, Dr.
Roughgarden rejects the view that homosexuality is an "unexplained anom-
aly," and discredits Darwin's theory of sexual selection. 4" Roughgarden relies
on two important behavioural realities that contradict Darwin's assertions.
First, she states that there is ample evidence in nature of species that contradict
his 'peacock' theory of males being more attractive and aggressive than
females, and more fundamentally, she identifies many species that do not fit
neatly into gender classifications or conform to preordained roles. 49 A second
143 Truluck, supra note 129.
4 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 60.
147 Burr, supra note 90.
1 Joan Roughgarden, The In-Crowd, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 17, 2004, at 36, 37.
'" Id. That this applies equally to the human species has been demonstrated by one recent
study, which revealed that as much as 0.2% to 2% of live births have some form of
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flaw in Darwin's theories, she posits, is that mating involves more than sexual
or physical procreation, and she cites examples of animals that form relation-
ships to help rear offspring.'50 As such, social compatibility and social
relationships are more critical than mere sexual mating, and in many animal
species, it is not merely a male and female who become involved in the
reproductive process. Roughgarden extrapolates that for humans, homosexual-
ity operates in much the same way, as a 'social inclusionary trait.""' Pointing
out that homosexuality is much too common to be a genetic aberration,
Roughgarden concludes that it evolves "whenever same-sex cooperation helps
achieve an evolutionary successful life: to survive, find mates and protect
one's young from harm. '"52
Equally compelling is the physiological and genetic research that seeks to
unravel the aetiology of homosexuality. A number of studies of the human
brain and body have explored various theories seeking to assign a biological
rationale for homosexuality. Studies of prenatal hormonal influences,
neurobiological factors (that is, relating to sexual differentiation of the brain),
genetics, and most famously perhaps, anatomical research of the human brain
itself, all suggest tantalizingly that sexual orientation is not a behavioural or
environmental phenomenon, but is an immutable, inherent characteristic.'53
The best known of the brain cell studies, one conducted by Dr. Simon LeVay,
claims that the size of nuclei in the front portion of the hypothalamus (a region
of the brain that controls hormones and sexuality) is smaller in homosexual
than in heterosexual men.'54 Chandler Burr concludes, after a detailed account
of the various lines of scientific research being undertaken, "[E]ven at this
relatively early date, out of the web of complexities it is becoming ever clearer
that biological factors play a role in determining human sexual orientation.""'
In other words, there is a good chance that homosexuals are born that way.
Whatever the outcome of philosophical debates regarding the relationship
of law and morality, if any is at all possible, the scientific advances represent
a formidable challenge to Lord Devlin's social cohesion theory. Given the
prevalence of homosexuality in the human and animal kingdom, even if there
'intersexuality.' Christine Gorma & Wendy Cole, Between the Sexes, TIME, Mar. 1,2004, at 54,
55.
"0 Roughgarden, supra note 148.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 39.
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exists some notion of a shared morality, then it does not (and cannot) include
something as universal and inherent as homosexuality. Alternatively, even if
proscriptions against homosexuality do somehow form part of shared morality,
repeated, cross-cultural violation of this ethic has never had dire consequences
anywhere, rendering legislative intervention unnecessary. Moreover, if, as is
increasingly likely, human sexual orientation is an inherent characteristic, then
state-sanctioned discrimination on this ground is monstrous and ought not to
exist in civilised, humane societies. A society could no more legitimately
discriminate against a person because he is gay than it could if he is short, or
brown-eyed, or left handed.
Many of the cases cited above, by refusing to rationalise their decisions
narrowly on the ground of equality, highlight social, psychological and other
imperatives that justify legal reform in relation to sexual minorities. In
Dudgeon, for instance, the European Court of Human Rights recognised:
The Government right affected by the impugned legislation
protects an essentially private manifestation of the human
personality.... As compared with the era when that legislation
was enacted, there is now a better understanding, and in conse-
quence an increased tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the
extent that in the great majority of the member States of the
Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or
appropriate to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in
question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions of the
criminal law should be applied... Although members of the
public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked,
offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private
homosexual acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application
of penal sanctions when it is consenting adults alone who are
involved.15 6
In this sense, privacy involves more than a spatial element. As it was put
by Justice Ackermann of South Africa's Constitutional Court, "Privacy
recognises that everyone has a right to a sphere of private intimacy and
autonomy which allows human relationships to be established without
interference from the outside community. The way in which sexuality is
156 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 60 (emphasis supplied).
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expressed is at the core of this area of private intimacy."'17 Or, as Justice
Blackmun declared in his seminal dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
"[O]nly the most wilful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy
is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life,
community welfare, and the development of human personality."'58
In every discipline-psychiatry, medicine, anthropology, biology, and even
law-attitudes and opinions towards homosexuality have been changing.
Whether because sexual orientation is viewed as a biological construct or
simply as a manifestation of human conduct to be respected in its private
expression, discrimination on this ground is increasingly regarded as
unjustified and irrational. The case for dismantling discriminatory laws has
been eloquently put by Justice L'Heureux-Dube in her dissenting opinion in
Egan,5 9 where two homosexual men who had lived together for more than
forty-five years sought the same spousal benefits and recognition as a
heterosexual couple. According to the learned justice,
Equality, as that concept is enshrined as a fundamental human
right within section 15 of the Charter, means nothing if it does
not represent a commitment to recognising each person's equal
worth as a human being, regardless of individual difference.
Equality means that our society cannot tolerate legislative
distinctions that treat certain people as second-class citizens, that
demean them, that treat them as less capable for no good reason,
or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.'
60
Thomas Jefferson famously said, "[L]aw is often but the tyrant's will, and
always so when it violates the right of the individual."'' Against the rising
tide of 'public and judicial opinion worldwide rationalising the removal of
discriminatory laws and practices against homosexuality, the president of
Guyana caved into the pressure of sectarian interests and refused to sign the
sexual orientation non-discrimination provision into law. In this, he was later
supported by his government, despite the fact that the provision embodied a
... Nat'l Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, [1998] 2 C.H.R.L.D.
443.
478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986).
1 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
,60 See [1995] 124 D.L.R. at 631 (Can.).
16' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac H. Tiffany (1819), in LETTERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (1975).
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recommendation made by theirreform Commission after four months of public
consultations. This was not merely lamentable; it was the tyrant's will.
V. CONCLUSION
The CRC, established after events that convulsed Guyana, presented the
ideal forum to initiate an overhaul of the Bill of Rights. Act 10 however, with
its rag-tag collection of amendments, is a bitterly disappointing conclusion to
this process, both for what it does and for what it fails to do. The reason why
some areas of the Bill of Rights were addressed while others were ignored will
remain an enduring mystery, and one can only speculate that the explanation
lies somewhere in the fact that the entire process was politically driven. As for
the recommendations actually adopted, the extent to which they were mangled
in their implementation is truly astonishing. Regarding the reference to
international treaties for example, there is little sense that this represents a
genuine aspiration to be guided by evolving modem developments, and
together with most of the so-called 'new' rights, these innovations seem to be
more about appearance than substance. Other unforgivable lapses include the
obvious unfamiliarity of the drafters with both the specifics and nuances of
human rights jurisprudence, which resulted in the removal of the only
reference to privacy in the Bill of Rights and the unnecessary inclusion of
multiple equality rights.
One small example will suffice to illustrate how ill-conceived and poorly-
executed Act 10 in fact is. Although sexual orientation was eventually
discarded as a prohibited ground of discrimination, it can still be invoked via
other avenues. For instance, a prospective litigant can rely on the interpreta-
tion given to "sex" as including sexual orientation by the UNHRC-an
influential and relevant precedent given article 154A(1). Of course, this
approach may be defeated by article 154A(2), discussed above, but that still
leaves available the inchoate article 149D that grants to all persons (unclassi-
fied) equality before the law, as well as the newly added article 39(2) that
mandates courts to pay due regard to "international law, international
conventions, covenants and charters bearing on human rights." In this maze
of contradictory provisions, it is supremely difficult to predict a likely
outcome. At this stage, all that is clear is that, despite the rhetoric that
surrounded the Constitution reform process, the reality is that Act 10 surely
represents the nadir of constitutional reform.
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